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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case concerns whether or not an existing Alpine
City Sewer Connection Ordinance is an ultra vires act.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court ruled that the Alpine City Sewer
Connection Ordinance is an ultra vires act and awarded Summary
Judgment to Respondent on September 30, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to
affirm the Summary Judgment entered by the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The presently existing Alpine City Sewer C6nnection
Ordinance provides for mandatory sewer connection,of all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,1may contain errors.

;-

buildings located on property within 500 feet of an existing
sewer line.

The Respondent's property lies approximately 365

feet from an existing sewer line.

Therefore, under the Alpine

City Ordinance the Respondent is required to connect to the sewer
line.

Pursuant to the Ordinance, Respondent was assessed a sewer

connection fee in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS
($1,500.00).

Each month Alpine City sends Respondent a billing

in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR AND N0/100
DOLLARS ($1,464.00), the remaining amount due on the sewer
connection fee assessed against the Respondent.
In this action, the Respondent filed a Complaint
alleging the above facts and asserting that Alpine City is
without authority to provide for mandatory hookups for any
building located on property more than 300 feet from an existing
sewer line.

Respondent also sought an Order of the Court

determining~that

Appellant may not assess Respon9ent a sewer

connection fee.

Appellant filed an Answer alleging it had

authority to enact and enforce the Ordinance, and counterclaimed
for an Order requiring Respondent to pay the remaining amount due
on the sewer connection fee.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN THE.INSTANT CASE
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It is clear that under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure Summary Judgment may be rendered forthwith when
appropriate.

As stated:

• the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
The Respondent in the instant case has been awarded
Summary Judgment by complying with the above rule.

All

reasonable factual inferences leave no genuine issue in dispute
and disclose no triable issue of fact.

The Judgment should

therefore be affirmed to promote the prompt administration of
justice.

As noted in National American Life Ins. Co. vs. Bayou

Country Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965):
The rules permitting summary judgments should
not be enlarged by construction yet it should
be liberally interpreted to effectuate their
purpose, to effect the prompt administration
of justice, and to expedite litigation by
avoiding needless trials where no triable
issue of fact is disclosed.
Id., 403 P.2d at 29.

The proposition that Summary Judgment is

proper when there are no material factual issues in dispute is
well established.

See, among others, Rich vs. McGovern, 551 P2d

1266 (Utah 1976); Trans America Ins. Co. vs. United Resources,
Inc. 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P2d 165 (1970); Leininger vs.
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33(1965); and
Foster vs. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967).
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Appellant quotes Controlled Receivables Inc. vs.
Harmon, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966) in arguing that the
trial court must consider all relevant facts and the reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the parties against whom
the motion is made, and that Summary Judgment is a harsh measure.
This argument is disputed by the Utah Supreme Court in the later
case, Burningham vs. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974).

After the

plaintiff in that case lost a Summary Judgment, the Court stated:
"Plaintiff says the case should be decided
under the rules that (1) The evidence should
be viewed in a light favorable to the
Plaintiff and (2) A Summary Judgment
is a harsh rule. He is not correct in
either claim.
In Summary Judgments,
evidence is not to be viewed. The
Judgment can be given only in case
there is no dispute on a material
evidentuary matter. We do not see that
it is a harsh rule to tell a party that
he is or is not entitled to recover as a
matter of law when the facts are not in
dispute."
Id., 525 P.2d at 621.
In the instant case, there are no material issues of
fact.

The Appellant's brief argues that the Court should have

received evidence as to the reasonableness of the sewer
connection requirement.

However, the Court determined that the

City did not have authority to require connection of buildings on
property more than 300 feet from an existing sewer line.
Therefore, the issue of whether or not the connection requirement

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was reasonable is immaterial and should not bar a grant of
Summary Judgment.
POINT II
THE ENACTMENT OF THE ALPINE CITY SEWER CONNECTION
ORDINANCE WAS AN ULTRA VIRES ACT ON PART OF THE APPELLANT AND,
THEREFORE, SUCH ORDINANCE IS UNLAWFUL AND VOID.
Traditionally, Courts have strictly construed all
delegations of power from states to local governments.
of strict construction is known as the Dillon Rule.

This rule

A local

government had no authority to act in any area unless it was
specifically and explicitly given authority by the state
legislature.

However, in recent years most states, (including

Utah) have relaxed this rule of strict construction.

See cases

cited by Appellant, State v. Hutchinson, No. 16087, (S. Ct. Utah,
filed Dec. 9, 1980); John Call and Clark Jenkins v. City of West
Jordan,

No~

15908 (S. Ct. Utah, filed Dec. 26, 1979); and Rupp v.

Grantsville, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980).

Local units of government

are no longer governed by the Dillon Rule and may enact
ordinances under general welfare grants such as that contained in
the Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, 1953, as amended.
However, in rejecting the rule of strict construction,
the Court did recognize that there are still limitations on the
authority of local governments acting under broad welfare
clauses.

In Hutchinson, supra, the Court stated:
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• . • local governments are without authority
to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in
conflict with, state statutory law.
Salt Lake
City vs. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434
(1968). Also an ordinance is invalid if it
intrudes upon an area which the legislature
has pre-empted by comprehensive legislation
intended to blanket a particular field.
Hutchinson, supra, pg. 90.

In 1981 the Utah Supreme Court in

Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission, No. 16833 (Utah
1981) again declared, "This Court has previously ruled that local
governments may legislate by ordinance in areas previously dealt
with by state legislation, provided the ordinance in no way
conflicts with existing state law • • • ",Id., at 1144.

See also

'
Salt
Lake City vs. Howe, 106 P705 (Utah.1910); and Salt Lake City

vs. Kusse, 93 P2d 671 (Utah 1938).
As a further limitation the Court in Hutchinson stated
that "specific grants of authority may serve to limit the means
available under the general welfare clause, for some limitation
may be imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use of
power in a particular manner." Hutchinson, supra, at 95.

Thus,

local governments can rely on broad general w(•lfare clauses for
authority to enact ordinances not specifically authorized by the
legislature.

But the broad exercise of authority is limited in

the following specific instances:
1.

When the ordinance is prohibited by state statute.
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2.

When the ordinance is in conflict with the state

3.

Where a state statute directs the use of a power in

statute.

a particular manner.
4.

Where the ordinance involves an area which has been

pre-empted by comprehensive state legislation.
In the instant case, Alpine City has enacted an
ordinance requiring hookup of all buildings located within 500
feet of an existing city sewer line.

It. claims authority for so

doing under a broad general grant of power to enact ordinances
for the health, welfare, and safety of the city residents.
However, in this particular case, most of the limitations set

~

forth above should apply and prevent the city from enforcing its
ordinance.

Section 10-8-38 of the Utah code specifically directs

that a city may ".

provide for mandatory hookup where the

sewer is available and within 300 feet of any property line . .
The 300 foot distance is a limit on the city's authority.

The

state legislature has specifically directed the city how to
exercise its authority and any ordinance which requires a hookup
of buildings at a distance greater than 300 feet is clearly in
conflict with the state statute.

Furthermore, Section 10-8-38

pre-empts the field of requiring connection to municipal sewer
lines. ·The statute deals with what buildings can be required to
connect, what charge can be made for the connection, and how the
mandatory hookup can be enforced.

Therefore, even in light of
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"

the new Utah Supreme Court decisions rejecting the strict
construction of the Dillon Rule, the ordinance enacted by Alpine
City is clearing ultra vires and consequently unlawful and void.
If the Alpine City ordinance is allowed to stand, then the
limitations set forth in the Hutchinson decision have no meaning
at all.
The Appellant urges that the use of the word "may" in
Section 10-8-38 indicates that a municipality is not bound by the
300 foot limit set forth therein.
misconstrues the statute.

However, Appellant clearly

If a municipality can increase the 300

foot limit to a 500 foot limit (or any other limit) in its
discretion, then the 300 foot requirement in Section 10-8-38 can
serve no purpose whatsoever.

Including the term "300 feet" in

the statute would be a waste of time since it would have no
meaning.

The only reasonable explanation is that the legislature

intended to give municipalities a power to require sewer
connections but also intended to limit that power to buildings
located on property within 300 feet of an existing sewer line.
The word "may" simply gives the municipality the discretion to
require sewer hookup of buildings on property within the 300 foot
limit.

Appellant also quotes McQuillin On Municipal Corporations

as support for the idea that a municipality has an inherent right
under its police power to compel property owners to make
connection with the sewer within a reasonable distance when the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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public health requires it.

However, McQuillin also states the

following:
" • . . the operation of a sewer system has
been said to be a matter of state-wide concern
and, where the state legislature has entered
the field, any attempt of a city to deal
therewith except in strict accordance with
the statutes covering the subject would be
without force and effect." (Emphasis added)
McQuillin On Municipal Corporations, Third Edition Revised,
Volume II, at Section 31-lOA.
CONCLUSION
The material facts in this case are without dispute.
They clearly show that the Alpine City ordinance is outside of
the city's authority and therefore constitutes an ultra vires
act.

Accordingly, the Summary Judgment granted in favor of the

Plaintiff by the District Court below should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2'J. 41/-l:ay

of February,

1982.

ot
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756-7658
MAILING CERTIFICATE
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing Brief to John C. Backlund, Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant, 350 East Center Street, Provo, Utah 84601,
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